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RICHARD MOSER

Introduction II

Was It the End or Just a Beginning?

American Storytelling and the History of the Sixties

DID THE Sixties die a quick and quiet death? Can the final decades of the American Century be accurately labeled a "conservative era," as so many left and liberal academics and analysts insist? The most widely influential treatments of the 1960s see a wave of popular protest that crested in 1968, followed by the rapid decline of social movements and a national trend toward conservatism, co-optation, backlash, and quiescence.[1] We intend to challenge this interpretation by investigating significant elements of continuity between the social movements and cultural trends of the 1960s and later political and cultural developments. Rather than endorsing the idea that the period between 1970 and the end of the century was a time of decline and cynicism (or of the ascendance of a triumphal conservatism), this volume examines the many ways that Americans continued to advance important aspects of the Sixties' unfinished agenda.

Certainly, the movements of that thirty-year period often seemed on the defensive. The battles, for instance, against aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and Robert Bork's nomination for the Supreme Court lacked the iconoclastic drama of the free-speech movement or Mississippi Freedom Summer. But from the 1980s to the new century, Mississippi Freedom Summer inspired new seasons of activism in Redwood Summer, Union Summer, and Democracy Summer. The peace movement that greeted the first Gulf War did not became an engine of social change like its predecessor, yet it was an effective, broad-based, and spirited response that successfully asserted very real constraints on U.S. policy.

It is valuable, indeed refreshing, to consider the trench-warfare of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s from the perspective of the Right. However much conservatives possessed an insurgent élan, they recognized that the constituencies of the post-1960s social movements held the cultural high ground. It was this painful recognition that energized the New Right and their desire for the restoration of what they imagined to be a superior traditional world. In this sense, then, we are more in agreement with those New Right conservatives who waged prolonged war against what they called "the Left" than with historians who write of the Sixties' death.

During the 1990s, the renaissance of the labor movement and the wave of demonstrations that started with Seattle 1999 convinced many that a resurgent movement for change was afoot. These new democratic movements continue and are impossible to explain without reference to the various political currents and alternative cultures that blossomed during the Sixties.

The essays in this volume demonstrate that social changes unleashed during the Sixties continued to shape American life until the end of the century. The attacks on New York and Washington, the subsequent war on terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are world-historic events but their meanings and consequences are far from clear. If these political and armed conflicts proceed as U.S. leaders have projected, they could be analogous to the Cold War in duration and character and could become what John F. Kennedy once described as a "long, twilight struggle." The Cold War had multiple, ambiguous and unintended consequences ranging from anticommunist hysteria to the civil rights movement and gave rise to both the New Right and the New Left. Given the doctrine of preemptive war, the rise of a grassroots antiwar movement, and the conflicting understandings of freedom and empire such polarization implies, it may well be that social movements similar to those we describe in this volume will continue to be a major influence in the politics and culture of the United States.

To see the Sixties and the movements that followed as part of an American tradition we must broaden the scope of our analysis beyond recent events and place the late-twentieth-century United States within the grand narratives of its own history. Scholars such as Richard Slotkin and James Gilbert have already begun to create accounts that understand recent history as rooted in many of the values, ideals, and social trends that reach back to the nation's earliest times.[2] We may join that exploration by listening closely to old stories of new beginnings.

NEW FRONTIERS, APOCALYPSE NOW, AND THE MIRAGE OF PARADISE

All interpretations of the 1960s borrow from our inherited ways of understanding new beginnings. The reigning historical accounts explain that time as a utopian moment in which America's rebellious sons and daughters strove for authenticity and sought to perfect the world with moral and political ideals that envisioned an almost apocalyptic change. In this view, Sixties activists were the descendants of radical pacifists, existentialists, radical intellectuals, millennialists, abolitionists, utopian communards, and finally the original protest reformers of the new frontier, the Puritans.[3] As with their forebears, the fantastic hopes of Sixties activists were dashed, followed by a lament of loss and decline. Scholars called this slipping away of the Puritan vision "declension," and we use the same concept to draw attention to the continuity between historical events and historians' interpretations of them.[4]

Declensionist readings of the Sixties unconsciously replicated a view of historical and social change that derived its logic, emotional power, and narrative form from the culture of the frontier and from the apocalyptic strain in American religious culture. While these interpretive metaphors do resonate deeply with certain aspects of the 1960s, an alternative, equally compelling interpretation of the period could look instead to the American Revolution, Civil War, and Reconstruction, and the prophetic tradition of Judaism and Christianity. Interpretations that appreciate the sensibility of American revolutions and believe that people shape their own destiny by using the past, not fleeing from it, allow for a more open-ended story that can encompass the social movements and cultural changes of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Such a history disallows claims of certain triumph or defeat and acknowledges contingency, possibility, and conflict.

Stories of decline recast essential elements of two enduring and intertwined narratives that have been used to explain endings and new beginnings since America itself began. Early European colonists looked at the new land and imagined it as a wild frontier where their apocalyptic hopes for a godly community could be fulfilled. The idea of the frontier and the apocalypse have shaped the national character and American storytelling traditions ever since. Most scholars discuss the frontier as the cradle of empire, a master narrative of domination and a source of violence in the United States. That is only half the story. The frontier also calls us to a great, if ultimately misguided, adventure. Its vast untouched spaces promise spiritual renewal, freedom, and material wealth.

In 1702, when Cotton Mather wrote the first history of this country, he pictured the Puritans "flying from the deprivations of Europe to the American Strand" and inaugurated a lasting view of history that understood renewal as the product of departure and flight.[5] Frederick Jackson Turner's famed "frontier thesis" first granted the frontier a premier role in scholarly explanations of U.S. history and culture. William Appleman Williams elaborated Turner's conception of the frontier as a "gate of escape from the bondage of the past" into a theory that explained how Europeans, then Americans, attempted to evade social and political problems or oppressive institutions by leaving them all behind and starting over fresh.[6] Richard Slotkin's mighty study of the frontier argued that the political ideas, military doctrines, and cultural genres that shaped America's response to the world all replicated a process of "separation, regression to a more . . . 'natural' state and regeneration through violence" that originated in the frontier experience.[7] All these interpretations agree that deeply imbedded in U.S. culture is the presumption that the first step on the path to change begins with escape, departure, and separation.

While the physical frontier is no longer a viable resort for most Americans, the logic of the frontier lives on most forcefully in the imperial spirit but also remains a powerful mode of comprehension and identity that shapes social and political activity across what are otherwise profound political divisions. Frontier mythology leads us to find our problems and their solutions along the outside edge of our country rather than within. Thus, NSC 68, written in 1950, defined Cold War policy by locating a global borderline between freedom and communism that required policing and containment. Internal dissenters could not be accepted as authentic and so were attacked as "un-American."[8] Following this logic, liberal leaders of the 1960s convinced themselves that the creation of a new anticommunist nation in distant Vietnam was crucial to U.S. domestic security and prosperity.

During these same years, youthful hippies felt such a profound revulsion for urban commercial life that many withdrew to rural communes. Other kinds of retreats—psychological, cultural, and pharmaceutical—were far more common. At the height of radical engagement, some of the most committed and active cultural and political radicals adopted the stance of outsider, and the pose of permanent withdrawal remains a marker of dissent.

Frontier thinking satisfies the desire for newness and experimentation, most starkly articulated in the impulse to tear it all down and start over again, but directs the movement for change away from reforming existing political, cultural, and social institutions. Living on the edge is a kind of psychic utopia that thrives on feelings of release and freedom from the constraints of society, but it also guarantees that all sorts of seemingly radical actions and criticisms play themselves out without creating fundamental political change.

The focus on escape may produce resistance but weakens the capacity of social movements to propose practical alternatives and positive programs. Radicals are often attracted to frontier metaphors because they offer the most culturally ready modes of rebellion, but they are distracted by them as well because the frontier focus on the margin and periphery misdirect efforts away from reforming the core political institutions and culture understandings that most forcefully shape U.S. policy and history. Using the rhetoric of the frontier, John F. Kennedy was able to wed the optimistic hope for change to conventional politics. His appeal for Americans to "bear any burden" and rise to the challenges of a "New Frontier" enlisted reforming energy unleashed by the civil rights movement in the service of anticommunism abroad and the status quo at home.[9]

When the metaphors of escape and renewal are applied to historical time rather than physical space, as they now most often are, the frontier spirit encourages us to think that we must shed our past on the way to the future. History or tradition becomes the "old country" to be recalled sentimentally, then forgotten and cast aside. Attempts to bring about change interpreted through the lens of frontier mythology appear to be outside the currents of history: new, unique, original, unprecedented, and unrepeatable. Stories told in this vein have a closed circular quality that strips the 1960s of their historical context and leaves them "hermetically sealed off from what came before . . . and what has come since."[10] Historical accounts that measure the 1960s solely by the standards of escape and total change cannot help but see decline.

Ultimately, the frontier is able to operate so successfully as a symbolic substitute for revolution because both are metaphors of freedom.[11] The frontier promises freedom *from* the world, while revolution promises freedom *to participate* in it. This tension between opposing understandings of freedom can be read across virtually all the movements of the midcentury.

The values of the frontier and their power to displace revolutionary thinking are fortified by America's apocalyptic leanings. For the Puritans, frontier thought was fused with the expectation that as God's chosen people they would either suffer God's wrath for their sins or be rewarded for their virtue with salvation and a good earthly life in a perfect "city on the hill." Puritanism proposed that history turned on a delicate balance between the miraculous acts of God and studied, sweaty human striving. Some Puritans tilted toward the apocalyptic and collapsed human efforts for moral perfection into an instant and dramatic conversion experience they believed gave them a new birth in God's grace. They considered salvation a predestined act of God that no one could alter or prepare for. This style of apocalyptic belief was an important strain within Puritan religious attitudes that contributed to the American Revolution and over time became secularized into a way of viewing the world.[12]

As popular culture, apocalyptic thought directs our understanding of history and expectation of the future toward a binary of utopia or dystopia. We vacillate between a new world order of moral certainty and security and one of anarchy and Armageddon. Both are unknown worlds that follow an endtime that destroys the existing order. Apocalyptic thinking anticipates a "radical discontinuity of history," with the future bursting in on, rather than arising out of, the past or present.[13] History loses its power to explain and is reduced to a record of human corruption or a romantic recollection of lost innocence. Apocalyptic logic insists on a clean break between past and future but ultimately produces social passivity, because its adherents have no way to imagine the connection between what was, what is now, and what ought to be.

"Yet," as Christopher Rowland observed about early Christians, "life on the brink of the millennium is psychologically and politically impossible to sustain."[14] When a new dawn fails to materialize, apocalyptic hopes tend to return to more conventional preexisting beliefs or to degenerate into despair and cynicism. The wars, moral outrages, and religious uncertainty of the twentieth century have colored the apocalyptic imagination with a decidedly dismal cast.[15]

The apocalyptic posture did indeed shape some aspects of the 1960s and has certainly influenced historical thinking about the decade. Whether declensionist accounts despise the Sixties and the social movements or sympathetically bemoan the latter's presumed failure, these arguments belong to the same culture of apocalyptic desire that drove moralistic reformers, except that now their millennialist vision has soured into a sense of disaster, pessimism, or ironic detachment. As Perry Miller suggested about the Puritans, their very lament functioned as a cultural and psychic purge that "serves as a token payment upon the obligation" to their ideals and so "liberates the debtors" to return to the more immediate tasks of building empires and making money.[16] Some declensionist readings of the 1960s still cling to a vision of social change, but their deep sense of resignation implies that people can only wait for, not create, its coming.

The apocalyptic rupture from the past and the frontieresque departure toward new spaces and exotic cultures can actually predispose radicals to return to the fold and abandon their project. When political action is conceived of as striving for a world that has no practical connections to the past, or to what already exists, activism often comes to naught or devolves into adventure, repudiation, and piety. In the declensionist version of the Sixties, the past (or "the system," or "liberalism") is abandoned for a fresh start, rather than changed, and so remains intact to beckon as an attractive destination for disillusioned seekers. The radical frontiersman may head out boldly but, finding paradise a mirage, returns home to relive the past.[17]

Told in this light, the story of the 1960s came to its inevitable end as the covenant that bound the true radicals together was torn apart with their return to liberalism, conservatism, or the Marxism of the Old Left. What little remained after 1968, by this account, was the false radicalism of identity politics forever blinkered by its own narrow interests and vision. This version of the Sixties labors under a weighty sense of predestination as it moves inexorably toward declension.[18] There can be no denying its powerful resonance with significant groups of former activists. These narratives of total change and defeat do describe an important dimension of the 1960s but also leave much unsaid and unseen.

AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS, THE PROPHETIC VISION, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITION

The existing stock of American stories contains vitally important, if less appreciated, accounts of historical change that shift our attention from endings and failure to new beginnings by articulating the links between continuity and discontinuity, between destruction and creation, between human agency and the possibility for a better world.

The Revolution and Civil War destroyed empire and slavery but also served as acts of creation that gave birth to democratic traditions. The history of revolution, reconstruction, and reform are enormously complex human events that contain a frontier and apocalyptic dimension—but, for the purposes of understanding the legacy of the 1960s, these founding movements are even more useful because they lend themselves to narrative forms that defy the logic of declension with counterthemes of transformation and reconstruction.

By using ideas of transformation and reconstruction, we can better envision the processes of historical change as the play between continuity and discontinuity or between tradition and innovation. Not some nagging residue that must be overcome, cultural and historical traditions instead represent the inevitable grounds on which social change occurs and the raw materials from which new consciousness is constructed. Revolutions succeed when new, more inclusive, and compelling versions of worn-out traditions take root by assuming the latent power and liberating vision of some frayed but classic ideal. A better telling of the 1960s will investigate the worklike processes of social movements that embrace histories and traditions and simultaneously change them through intellectual inquiry and citizen activism.[19]

In the years just before the American Revolution, New England's radical ministers touched the hearts and minds of their congregations by investing the new meanings of liberty, natural rights, and reason into the old form of the Puritan sermon known as the jeremiad.[20] Jefferson's rhetorical strategy in the Declaration of Independence succeeded so well because its affinity with the jeremiad's themes of crisis, corruption, anxiety, and salvation allowed criticism of the king and the call to independence to be communicated with familiar syntax and style. Jefferson and the other signatories vowed allegiance to the cause with a solemn pledge and exhorted their audience to action "with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence." In so doing, they relied on a mode of comprehension deeply embedded in the American mind to marshal a nation toward the attainment of a lofty yet earthly destiny.[21] Tom Paine's *Common Sense* similarly adopts the rhetorical forms of traditional American Protestantism, as did some writings of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Samuel Adams.[22] In the crisis of the Revolution, political actors resorted to the jeremiad as the best available model of persuasive speech but invested it with new political energy.

In the mid-1770s, revolutionary leaders across the political spectrum sought to forge a new national identity by evoking the heroic past. They revised the original Puritans' "errand into the wilderness" and the Revolution into commensurate episodes of the historic struggle of freedom against tyranny. As Sacvan Bercovitch tells us: "The revolution was the movement linking the two quintessential moments in the story of America—twin legends of the country's founding fathers—The Great Migration and the War of Independence."[23] The sense of continuity with the past was so profound in the imaginations of revolutionary Americans that Franklin and Jefferson proposed that the seal of the new nation depict not simply the Puritans, but the Puritans' own imaginary forebears. An image of Moses leading his people to the Promised Land and inscribed with the legend "Rebellion to Tyrants Is Obedience to God" united biblical, colonial, and revolutionary content into a symbol of liberation.[24]

James Madison typified revolutionary transformation when he turned the classic arguments against large republics into the basis of a lasting modern republic and reconceived the English constitution of monarchical, aristocratic, and common representation into three branches of popular government.[25] Madison's intellectual achievement mirrored the mass transformation of a people who initially undertook armed conflict intent on reclaiming the narrow rights of freeborn Englishmen, but subsequently produced a new American identity based on the promise of universal principles.

Abraham Lincoln's "mystic chords of memory" enunciated revolutionary patriotism as the heroic measure of his generation of citizen-soldiers and claimed the American Revolution as his "ancient faith" and the only standard by which the reconstruction of the nation could be rightly judged.[26] For Frederick Douglass, slavery betrayed the ideals of the republic and only slavery's destruction could fulfill America's revolutionary vision. Douglass's critical embrace of American religious and political traditions formed the organizing principle of his widely read slave narrative and 1852 oration, "What to a Slave Is the Fourth of July?"[27]

These revolutions transformed and reconstructed the past, and we would do well to remember that some of the most influential figures of Sixties radicalism, from Robert F. Williams to Martin Luther King, from Ho Chi Minh to the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, repeatedly evoked this tradition of revolution in damning the contemporary U.S. government.[28]

Narrative strategies that make transformation and reconstruction their analytical metaphors will both reconfigure the historical lineage of the 1960s and resist notions of the decade's decline because they allow us to see that social movements do not destroy or repudiate the past but rather are bound to rewrite the past. At their best, the social movements of the 1960s salvaged the universal values that republicanism, liberalism, and socialism once championed. When continuity with classic political traditions is confirmed, the reflex for return to current and more decrepit versions of these traditions is diminished. If the social movements of the 1960s and after are understood as the best representations of U.S. political traditions, then connections to, and continuations of, the past are enhanced, and there is less risk of turning to some new form of conservatism or orthodoxy. Once we recognize that the historical antecedents of the 1960s are located deep within the contours of U.S. history, then its legacy in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s also becomes more visible.

Like the transformative approach derived from the Revolution, the Puritan legacy can also help us to place new beginnings in historical time characterized by both continuity and discontinuity. Interwoven with apocalyptic yearnings was a prophetic vision also deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions and equally influential on secular conceptions of social change.[29] "Prophetic" here does not imply adherence to biblical predictions of Armageddon, or the ability to see the future. Rather prophecy shifts our attention from endtimes to beginnings and asserts the human ability to create a better future in this world. The prophetic view held that the good and godly life was attainable through human action and choice.

Some Puritans saw conversion as a gradual process that stressed human preparation for God's grace rather than relying on God's will alone.[30] Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century post-millennialists continued the prophetic tradition. They believed that Christ would return only after people made Christianity an earthly truth and lived a thousands years in peace.[31] From 1830 until the Civil War, widespread reform movements, from abolitionism to women's rights to temperance, expressed the belief that the world could be improved, perhaps even perfected, by taking action.

In modern secular terms, the prophetic consciousness of political actors becomes apparent when they articulate a path between what now exists and the world that ought to be and insist that this path can be constructed by human activity and choice. While the apocalyptic view waits for a swift end to the old world and an immediate start for the new, the prophetic engages history as a gradual, unfolding, and challenging struggle that is worth the effort because a new world is possible.[32] Within the prophetic vision, history is seen as transition.

Prophetic interpretations can minimize declensionist readings of the 1960s precisely because they do not require a total break with history for justice to be achieved. John Wiley Nelson suggests that inherent in the prophetic is the idea that "the new age continues and fulfills the possibilities of the old age, rather than inaugurating a totally different world."[33] Put another way by James Darsey, prophets are "simultaneously insider and outsider." "Prophetic discourse," he argues, "seeks to . . . re-create the audience in accordance with a strict set of ideals . . . assented to in principle but unrealized by the audience."[34] Prophet actors give voice to the discord between ideals and reality.

This perspective finds American ideals damaged but still viable despite their tainted origins in slavery and their marginalization under the current corporate and imperial order. Democracy, justice, and freedom are worthy ideals for political action precisely because they remain unfulfilled. Much of the 1960s and its legacy can be interpreted through the prophetic lens as a movement that pursued a future whereby the values of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights might be finally realized. Certainly the civil rights movement borrowed heavily from the prophetic traditions of black Christianity in articulating a revolutionary vision rooted in the American idiom.

The transformative, reconstructive, and prophetic modes of understanding social change also differ from the frontier and apocalyptic perspectives in allowing us to embrace open-ended contingency and complexity rather than stark opposites and sealed fates. Like the America Revolution and Civil War, the promise of the 1960s was both won and lost. Ironically, it was the very anxiety of the uncertain historical transition of the late twentieth century that produced the desire to impose conclusive outcomes on the decade's legacy. Apocalyptic, frontier, and declension metaphors appeal most powerfully when old standards and expectations no longer apply, but new ones are still uncertain or unformed.[35] In this sense, the declensionist accounts of the 1960s are a response to both the failure of utopian hopes and the real if ambiguous outcomes of popular activism. The current stalemate has lingered on, but activists endure despite the absence of total victory because they read history as a record of successes as well as setbacks. Instead of decline, the abundance and variety of social movements in the last three decades should yield an abundance of interpretations. Of course, even using the transformative and prophetic modes of analysis, historians will have to investigate for movements below the radar screen of mainstream media.

The essays in this volume join a number of existing works that see 1968 as a kind of beginning rather than a kind of ending. Works that move in this direction are *Reclaiming Democracy* by Meta Mendel-Reyes, and Sara Evans's classic *Personal Politics*. *Citizen Action and the New American Populism* by Harry C. Boyte, Heather Booth, and Steve Max chronicles the activism of the 1980s and also sees modern citizenship as the "re-emergence" of America's "most ancient" democratic vision. Ronald Fraser's *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt* is of particular interest because it deals with a history most conducive to declensionist thinking. In the U.S. edition of *1968*, by Ron Grele and Bret Eynon, the concern for social transformation wins out and as a result the narrative resists closure. The authors of *1968* present an "unfinished history" and so invite us to consider how its next chapters may be written. *The World the Sixties Made* contributes to this unfinished history of cultural change and political action.

The essays herein demonstrate that the movements of the 1960s created a durable, if variegated, alternative American public. Existing notions of citizenship were cast into doubt but not thoroughly dissolved, and people initiated the process of reconstructing the practice of citizen activism. This new public made possible the wars of position evident in the cultural and political history of the subsequent decades. In this view, then, the 1960s and 1970s appear as a halfway revolution that produced conflict and meaningful debate for the rest of the century. By recasting the dissent of the last half of the twentieth century as an effort to reconstruct citizenship, we may both rewrite the historiographic interpretations of recent social movements and better contribute to the ongoing renovation of the grand narratives of U.S. history.

Notes

1. The works that most powerfully represent this view are: James Miller, *Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987); Tom Hayden, *Reunion: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1988); Maurice Isserman, *If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York: Random House, 1973). One of the first works of this type was by ex-SDS leader Greg Calvert, tellingly titled *A Disrupted History: The New Left and the New Capitalism* (New York: Random House, 1971). For works that investigate the continuity between the Sixties and later decades, see Jack Whalen and Richard Flacks, *Beyond the Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows Up* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Lauren Kessler, *After All These Years: Sixties Ideals in a Different World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1990); and Bret Eynon "Look Who's Talking: Oral Memoirs and the History of the 1960s," *Oral History Review*, 19 (spring 1991): 99–107. For a thorough historiography see Van Gosse, "A Movement of Movements: The Definition and Periodization of the New Left," in Roy Rosenzweig and Jean-Christophe Agnew, eds., *A Companion to Post-1945 America* (London: Blackwell, 2002).

2. Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1992). James Gilbert, "New Left: Old America," in Sohnya Sayres, Anders Stephanson, Stanley Aronowitz, and Fredric Jameson, eds., *The 60s Without Apology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press in cooperation with Social Text, 1984), 244–47.

3. Gilbert, "New Left: Old America," 244–47; Eynon, "Look Who's Talking," 101, 103; Rick Perlstein, "Who Owns the Sixties?" *Lingua Franca*, May–June 1996, 33.

4. The original declension theme was articulated by Perry Miller in *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), 396, 400, and in his second volume, *From Colony to Province* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 484–85; Philip Greven, *The Protestant Temperament: Patterns of Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self in Early America* (New York: Knopf, 1980), 5–6; Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America, and the Making of a New Left* (Verso: New York, 1993), 7–10. See also Perlstein, "Who Owns the Sixties?" and Winifred Breines, "Whose New Left?" *Journal of American History*, 75, 2 (September 1988): 528–29.

5. Cotton Mather, "Magnolia Christi Americana" in Kenneth B. Murdock, ed., with the assistance of Elizabeth W. Miller, *Magnolia Cristi Americana: Books I and II* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977), 1.

6. William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), 257, 377–78, 472–73; James Livingston, *Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 273–79.

7. Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation*, 12.

8. National Security Council Document 68 was a top secret government report and one of the most influential policy statements of the Cold War.

9. Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation*, 1–5.

10. Gosse, *Where the Boys Are*, 9–10. See also Bret Eynon, "Cast upon the Shore: Oral History and New Scholarship on the Movements of the 1960s," *Journal of American History*, 83, 2 (September 1996): 562.

11. Edmund Morgan made this point about the great migration of Puritans to America; cited in Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 24.

12. Greven, *Protestant Temperament*, 354–61; Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 1–9 and chap. 4; Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*, 17–19; Paul Boyer, *When Time Shall Be No More* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), preface, prologue, 122–23; Nathan O. Hatch, *The Sacred Cause of Liberty: Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Ruth H. Bloch, *Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756–1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

13. Lois Parkinson Zamora, "The Myth of Apocalypse and the American Literary Imagination," in Zamora, ed., *The Apocalyptic Vision in America: Interdisciplinary Essays on Myth and Culture* (Bowling Green, Ohio: Popular Press, 1982), introduction, 98.

14. Christopher Rowland, "'Upon Whom the Ends of the Ages Have Come': Apocalypse and the Interpretation of the New Testament," in Malcolm Bull, ed., *Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), 55.

15. Krishan Kumar, "Apocalypse, Millennium, and Utopia Today," in Bull, *Apocalypse Theory*, 202–6.

16. Perry Miller, "Errand into the Wilderness," in *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1956), 8–9. See also Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes toward History* (Los Altos, Calif.: Hermes, 1939), 44.

17. Martin Sklar, *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 176–96, 207–8; J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 550.

18. Maurice Isserman, "The Not-So-Dark and Bloody Ground," *American Historical Review* 94, 4 (October 1989): 994–97, 1008.

19. Sklar, *United States*, 196.

20. Hatch, *Sacred Cause of Liberty*, 69–71; Bercovitch, *American Jeremiad*, chaps. 3, 4.

21. Bloch, *Visionary Republic*, 93.

22. Bercovitch, *American Jeremiad*, 118–25; Hatch, *Sacred Cause of Liberty*, 91–95.

23. Bercovitch, *American Jeremiad*, 132; Hatch, *Sacred Cause of Liberty*, 76–81.

24. Richard Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam Era* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 165; Bercovitch, *American Jeremiad*, 124.

25. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor Books, 1999), 10 and 51; Gordon Wood, *Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 61–63, 608–14; Greven, *Protestant Temperament*, 354–61.

26. Livingston, *Pragmatism*, 287–89.

27. Linda Jimison, *The Frederick Douglass Fourth of July Oration at Rochester, New York, July 5, 1852* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Lifestar Enterprises, 1994).

28. Moser, *New Winter Soldiers*.

29. James Francis Darsey, *The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America* (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Bercovitch, *American Jeremiad*, 94–103.

30. Norman Pettit, *The Heart Prepared: Grace and Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), cited in Greven, *Protestant Temperament*, 8–9.

31. Boyer, *When Time Shall Be No More*, 67–68.

32. Debra Bergoffen, "The Apocalyptic Meaning of History," in Zamora, ed., *Apocalyptic Vision in America*, 26.

33. John Wiley Nelson, "The Apocalyptic Vision in American Popular Culture," in Zamora, ed., *Apocalyptic Vision in America*, 166.

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